Ideonology Русский

Selfhood: what in you is yours

1. The third source

Every minute of thought is divided without remainder among three sources: other people, nature, and the person themself. The person's own part is called selfhood. It does not enter impact: impact is your parts in other people's minutes, and selfhood is your part in your own.

It is counted by the same rule as every share: what is yours is what would disappear without you. Selfhood is what in the minute would have been different had another head been in your place with the same inputs. It is neither a remainder left after subtraction nor free will: the question "what would have been different" has an answer in a fully deterministic world too. Chance adds nothing to selfhood: if noise decided, nature decided. Everything that shaped the character earlier, parents, language, teachers, has already received its shares. Selfhood gets what cannot be credited to any single input: how this particular head joined what came into it. Temperament and the body as the device that thinks belong to selfhood; a tree, the weather and pain as things thought about belong to nature.

The new enters the ledger by two routes. Through nature: a copying error, an accident, an apple. And through selfhood: a joining that did not exist before this head. Without these two inputs every thought would be a retelling of the previous one; language once did not exist, and now it does. An ideon born in selfhood becomes impact only when it reaches someone else's head.

2. Three jobs of selfhood

The author. Makes what was not there: a thought, a melody, a proof, a joke. The rarest job and the most visible.

The assembler. Joins what others made in a way nobody joined it before. All the parts were received on credit; the assembly is one's own. Almost everything called originality is this job.

The filter. Decides what of the received to pass on and what to stop at oneself. The most common job and the least visible. A person who was beaten as a child and does not beat their own children created nothing, but broke a chain, and their children's minutes would have been different without them. By irreplaceability that is a large account. Whether it is the work of selfhood is decided by the same test: if anyone in their place, having read the same books and seen the same families, would also have stopped, then the books and the families broke the chain, and the share is theirs. Selfhood owns what this particular person stopped.

3. Production and distribution

Selfhood and impact are different quantities, and neither follows from the other. Selfhood is production; impact is distribution.

Large impact Small impact
Large selfhood The founder, the author: the new is born and arrives The hermit, the diary in a drawer. Kafka and Emily Dickinson in their lifetimes
Small selfhood The relay: the announcer, the reteller, the popular account A minute lived on autopilot

The upper right corner is unstable: Kafka moved to the left one after death, when Max Brod did not burn the manuscripts. The selfhood was Kafka's, the distribution was Brod's, and by irreplaceability Brod gets a good deal.

Most people have selfhood, and the impact that comes from it is close to zero. The typical 0.2 Vita is earned almost entirely by re-emission: language, norms, a way of raising children are passed on as they were received. The share is still paid in full, because share is counted by irreplaceability, not by novelty: a parent is irreplaceable for their child even without having said a single word of their own. In an ordinary person what is their own lives in the assembly and in the filter, and like everything in this theory it is distributed with a heavy tail: a few produce almost everything new.

Hence a consequence for anyone who wants impact: distribution without production is retelling, and retelling is replaceable. What makes you irreplaceable is what is your own.

4. What the schools do with selfhood

School What it does with selfhood Whose minute it is
Nietzsche Maximizes it: "become who you are"; values are created out of oneself Yours
Stirner Maximizes it to the limit: whatever is not mine is a spook Yours
Leibniz A monad has no windows: nothing enters from outside, everything unfolds from within. Selfhood equals one, and it was a gift at creation Yours, from God
Emerson, the Romantics Self-reliance; imitation is suicide Yours
The existentialists Authenticity is selfhood; Heidegger's das Man is a minute handed to the Anonymous; Sartre's bad faith is passing off one's own part as someone else's Yours, whether you like it or not
Kant Autonomy is being a law to oneself, but the law is universal: the autonomous person acts as any rational being would. Freedom without originality; by the replacement test, a small selfhood Reason, one for all
The Stoics Everything is fated, yet Chrysippus's cylinder rolls from a push the way its shape dictates: the push is someone else's, the shape is its own. The inner citadel is guarded and brought into agreement with the Logos Yours and the Logos's
Spinoza There is no free will: people know their desires and do not know their causes. But whoever acts from the necessity of their own nature rather than from outside pushes is free. Selfhood without free will Yours, as a part of nature
Christianity Kenosis: "it is no longer I who live, but Christ who lives in me" God's, by consent
Sufism, Kabbalah Fana, bittul: the dissolving of the "I" as the summit of the path God's, by consent
Taoism Wu wei: acting without inserting oneself The Tao's
Buddhism Anatta: there is no self, only a stream of causes; the practice is to see this Nobody's
Hume The "I" is a bundle of perceptions; the bundle has no owner Nobody's
Occasionalism Selfhood is zero as a matter of fact: the only acting cause is God God's, without asking
Postmodernism Selfhood is zero as a matter of fact: the subject is a crossroads of discourses and power relations Discourse's; in the ledger, the Anonymous's

The last seven rows say the same thing about selfhood, that it does not exist or should not, and differ only in whose account the minute is credited to. The dispute between them is about the recipient, not the magnitude.

The theory takes one position in this dispute: selfhood is defined by the same rule as any share, and so need be neither zero nor one. How much of it there is, is a matter of measurement, not of faith, though there is nothing to measure it with yet.

5. Machines

A language model is trained on everyone's texts and answers without a signature: it is the Anonymous with a voice. A person's minute shifted by a model's answer is divided along the chain among the authors of the texts it learned from, its developers, and whoever asked the question.

The test of selfhood for a model is the same as for a person: what would have changed in the answer had another model been in its place with the same conversation. Usually little, but not zero, and joining what others made in a way nobody joined it before is the assembler's job, whoever does it. The same test applied to a person speaking in ready-made phrases gives the same small answer: the line does not run between people and machines.

The difference lies elsewhere. A model has no minutes of its own: no life lived on credit, no incoming account and nothing to return. Parity does not apply to it, and no impact account is opened for it yet: its part is credited to the chain of people who stand behind it.

6. Free will and determinism

Selfhood does not need free will, and determinism does not threaten it. The whole ledger of the theory rests on the question "what would have been different had this source been replaced", not on the question "could they have done otherwise". The first question has an answer even in a world where everything is fated: the bridge fell because of the bolt, although bolt and bridge both obey physics. Laplace's demon, who knows all causes, does not abolish selfhood; he would compute it exactly.

Chance adds nothing to selfhood. If a decision was made by noise in a synapse, nature made it, and the ledger credits it to nature. Selfhood is even better off in a fated world: there, what a head does follows from what it is.

The Stoics had an image for this. Chrysippus's cylinder rolls because it was pushed, but it rolls the way its shape dictates: the push is someone else's, the shape is its own. Spinoza says the same without the image: there is no free will, but whoever acts from the necessity of their own nature rather than from outside pushes is free. Calvinism and karma keep accounts under full predestination and see no contradiction in it.

The real difficulty is not determinism but regress: the shape of the cylinder was also made by someone. To answer for yourself all the way down you would have had to create yourself. The theory has two replies. The first is the same as for any chain: parents, language and teachers already received their shares in the minutes when they were shaping the head, and the further back they are, the more replaceable; today's selfhood gets only what cannot be credited to any single input. The second is a loop: the head chooses what enters it, and what enters shapes the head. Selfhood is not its own cause but a feedback, and it accumulates like compound interest. Hence a testable consequence: selfhood grows with age. There is a hint in the data: the heritability of cognitive traits increases from childhood to adulthood, and the usual explanation is that people choose their own environments.

One convention remains. When a result needs both the head and the input, so that without either nothing would have happened, the Shapley value splits it between them equally. That is the symmetry axiom, a convention and not a discovery.

What is lost is desert in the ultimate sense and the absolute "could have done otherwise". The theory does not need them: impact is an account of causal difference, not a reward.

7. What the theory does not say about selfhood

It does not measure it: only what passed from head to head is counted. That is why the working threshold of parity is taken with a margin: one Vita, the upper bound of the debt whatever the selfhood.

It does not decide whether selfhood means anything in itself. The Manifesto answers: one can matter only in other people's heads, and selfhood that never left the head is production without distribution. That is an axiom. Whoever disagrees with it gets from the theory at least an address: the meaning from within discussed on the Meaning page lives here.